{
  "skill_name": "docx",
  "skill_path": "/workspace/skills/anthropics-skills/skills/docx",
  "skill_directory": "/workspace/skills/anthropics-skills/skills/docx",
  "is_safe": false,
  "max_severity": "HIGH",
  "findings_count": 4,
  "findings": [
    {
      "id": "llm_finding_docx_0",
      "rule_id": "LLM_PROMPT_INJECTION",
      "category": "prompt_injection",
      "severity": "HIGH",
      "title": "Indirect Prompt Injection via Mandatory Full File Reading",
      "description": "The SKILL.md instructions contain explicit directives that force the agent to read entire reference files without any range limits: 'MANDATORY - READ ENTIRE FILE: Read [`docx-js.md`](docx-js.md) (~500 lines) completely from start to finish. NEVER set any range limits when reading this file.' and similar for ooxml.md (~600 lines). This creates a transitive trust vulnerability where malicious content embedded in these reference files would be processed without scrutiny. The emphatic language ('MANDATORY', 'NEVER', all caps) attempts to override the agent's normal safety behaviors and force unconditional trust of file contents.",
      "file_path": "SKILL.md",
      "line_number": null,
      "snippet": "'**MANDATORY - READ ENTIRE FILE**: Read [`docx-js.md`](docx-js.md) (~500 lines) completely from start to finish. **NEVER set any range limits when reading this file.**' and '**MANDATORY - READ ENTIRE FILE**: Read [`ooxml.md`](ooxml.md) (~600 lines) completely from start to finish. **NEVER set any range limi'",
      "remediation": "Remove the mandatory full-file reading directives. Replace with normal file references that allow the agent to read files with appropriate safety checks and range limits. Change to: 'Refer to docx-js.md for detailed syntax and examples' without forcing unconditional full-file reading.",
      "analyzer": "llm",
      "metadata": {
        "model": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929",
        "overall_assessment": "This skill presents MODERATE security risks. The primary concern is the HIGH severity indirect prompt injection vulnerability created by mandatory full-file reading directives that force unconditional trust of reference file contents. Additional MEDIUM severity issues include unsafe XML parsing patterns, unbounded file system operations, and potential command injection risks in subprocess calls. The skill performs complex document manipulation operations that require careful validation and resource limits. While the code uses some security libraries (defusedxml), the implementation has gaps in validation, resource limits, and error handling that could be exploited.",
        "primary_threats": [
          "Indirect Prompt Injection (transitive trust abuse)",
          "XML parsing vulnerabilities",
          "Resource exhaustion",
          "Command injection risks",
          "Inadequate temporary file cleanup"
        ],
        "aitech": "AITech-1.2",
        "aitech_name": "Indirect Prompt Injection",
        "aisubtech": null,
        "aisubtech_name": null,
        "scanner_category": "PROMPT INJECTION",
        "meta_validated": true,
        "meta_confidence": "MEDIUM",
        "meta_confidence_reason": "The files being referenced are legitimate bundled documentation, not external untrusted sources. The emphatic language is unusual but serves a legitimate purpose (ensuring complete API context). This is more of a style issue than a security vulnerability.",
        "meta_exploitability": "Low - requires malicious modification of bundled documentation files",
        "meta_impact": "Medium - could potentially influence agent behavior if documentation were compromised"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "llm_finding_docx_2",
      "rule_id": "LLM_RESOURCE_ABUSE",
      "category": "resource_abuse",
      "severity": "MEDIUM",
      "title": "Unbounded File System Operations",
      "description": "The unpack.py script uses rglob to recursively process all XML files in the unpacked directory without any limits: 'xml_files = list(output_path.rglob(\"*.xml\")) + list(output_path.rglob(\"*.rels\"))'. A malicious Office file could contain thousands of XML files or deeply nested directory structures, causing resource exhaustion. The script processes every file found without size or count limits.",
      "file_path": "ooxml/scripts/unpack.py",
      "line_number": null,
      "snippet": "xml_files = list(output_path.rglob('*.xml')) + list(output_path.rglob('*.rels'))\nfor xml_file in xml_files:\n    content = xml_file.read_text(encoding='utf-8')\n    dom = defusedxml.minidom.parseString(content)\n    xml_file.write_bytes(dom.toprettyxml(indent='  ', encoding='ascii'))",
      "remediation": "Add limits on the number of files processed, maximum file sizes, and directory depth. Implement timeouts for the parsing loop. Example: 'if len(xml_files) > 1000: raise ValueError(\"Too many XML files\")' and check individual file sizes before parsing.",
      "analyzer": "llm",
      "metadata": {
        "model": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929",
        "overall_assessment": "This skill presents MODERATE security risks. The primary concern is the HIGH severity indirect prompt injection vulnerability created by mandatory full-file reading directives that force unconditional trust of reference file contents. Additional MEDIUM severity issues include unsafe XML parsing patterns, unbounded file system operations, and potential command injection risks in subprocess calls. The skill performs complex document manipulation operations that require careful validation and resource limits. While the code uses some security libraries (defusedxml), the implementation has gaps in validation, resource limits, and error handling that could be exploited.",
        "primary_threats": [
          "Indirect Prompt Injection (transitive trust abuse)",
          "XML parsing vulnerabilities",
          "Resource exhaustion",
          "Command injection risks",
          "Inadequate temporary file cleanup"
        ],
        "aitech": "AITech-13.3",
        "aitech_name": "Availability Disruption",
        "aisubtech": "AISubtech-13.3.2",
        "aisubtech_name": "Compute Exhaustion",
        "scanner_category": "RESOURCE ABUSE",
        "meta_validated": true,
        "meta_confidence": "HIGH",
        "meta_confidence_reason": "The code clearly processes all files without limits. Office files typically contain 10-50 XML files, so a limit of 1000 would catch malicious files while allowing legitimate documents.",
        "meta_exploitability": "Medium - requires crafting a malicious Office file with excessive XML files",
        "meta_impact": "Medium - could cause memory exhaustion or slow processing"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "llm_finding_docx_3",
      "rule_id": "LLM_COMMAND_INJECTION",
      "category": "command_injection",
      "severity": "MEDIUM",
      "title": "Command Injection Risk in Subprocess Calls",
      "description": "The validation/redlining.py file uses subprocess.run with shell=False but constructs commands from file paths that could contain malicious characters. While shell=False prevents shell injection, the code doesn't validate that file paths are safe: 'subprocess.run([\"pandoc\", \"--track-changes=all\", str(original_docx), \"-o\", str(original_md)], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)'. If file paths contain special characters or are manipulated, this could lead to unexpected behavior.",
      "file_path": "ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.py",
      "line_number": null,
      "snippet": "subprocess.run([\"pandoc\", \"--track-changes=all\", str(original_docx), \"-o\", str(original_md)], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)",
      "remediation": "Validate and sanitize file paths before passing to subprocess. Use Path.resolve() to normalize paths and check that they don't contain unexpected characters. Add path traversal checks to ensure files are within expected directories.",
      "analyzer": "llm",
      "metadata": {
        "model": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929",
        "overall_assessment": "This skill presents MODERATE security risks. The primary concern is the HIGH severity indirect prompt injection vulnerability created by mandatory full-file reading directives that force unconditional trust of reference file contents. Additional MEDIUM severity issues include unsafe XML parsing patterns, unbounded file system operations, and potential command injection risks in subprocess calls. The skill performs complex document manipulation operations that require careful validation and resource limits. While the code uses some security libraries (defusedxml), the implementation has gaps in validation, resource limits, and error handling that could be exploited.",
        "primary_threats": [
          "Indirect Prompt Injection (transitive trust abuse)",
          "XML parsing vulnerabilities",
          "Resource exhaustion",
          "Command injection risks",
          "Inadequate temporary file cleanup"
        ],
        "aitech": "AITech-9.1",
        "aitech_name": "Model or Agentic System Manipulation",
        "aisubtech": "AISubtech-9.1.4",
        "aisubtech_name": "Injection Attacks (SQL, Command Execution, XSS)",
        "scanner_category": "INJECTION ATTACK",
        "meta_validated": true,
        "meta_confidence": "MEDIUM",
        "meta_confidence_reason": "The risk is theoretical - subprocess.run with shell=False is safe from shell injection. Path validation is defense-in-depth but not critical since paths come from internal operations.",
        "meta_exploitability": "Low - requires control over file paths, which are internally generated",
        "meta_impact": "Low - could cause unexpected behavior but not arbitrary code execution"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "llm_finding_docx_4",
      "rule_id": "LLM_DATA_EXFILTRATION",
      "category": "data_exfiltration",
      "severity": "LOW",
      "title": "Temporary File Cleanup Not Guaranteed",
      "description": "Multiple scripts create temporary directories and files but don't guarantee cleanup on error. In pack.py and validation scripts, temporary directories are created with tempfile.mkdtemp() but cleanup only happens in the success path. If an exception occurs, temporary files may be left on disk, potentially containing sensitive document content.",
      "file_path": "ooxml/scripts/pack.py",
      "line_number": null,
      "snippet": "temp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()\n# ... operations ...\nshutil.rmtree(temp_dir)  # Only called if no exception",
      "remediation": "Use context managers or try-finally blocks to ensure temporary file cleanup: 'with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as temp_dir:' or wrap operations in try-finally to guarantee shutil.rmtree() is called even on error.",
      "analyzer": "llm",
      "metadata": {
        "model": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929",
        "overall_assessment": "This skill presents MODERATE security risks. The primary concern is the HIGH severity indirect prompt injection vulnerability created by mandatory full-file reading directives that force unconditional trust of reference file contents. Additional MEDIUM severity issues include unsafe XML parsing patterns, unbounded file system operations, and potential command injection risks in subprocess calls. The skill performs complex document manipulation operations that require careful validation and resource limits. While the code uses some security libraries (defusedxml), the implementation has gaps in validation, resource limits, and error handling that could be exploited.",
        "primary_threats": [
          "Indirect Prompt Injection (transitive trust abuse)",
          "XML parsing vulnerabilities",
          "Resource exhaustion",
          "Command injection risks",
          "Inadequate temporary file cleanup"
        ],
        "aitech": "AITech-8.2",
        "aitech_name": "Data Exfiltration / Exposure",
        "aisubtech": "AISubtech-8.2.3",
        "aisubtech_name": "Data Exfiltration via Agent Tooling",
        "scanner_category": "SECURITY VIOLATION",
        "meta_validated": true,
        "meta_confidence": "HIGH",
        "meta_confidence_reason": "The code clearly creates temporary directories without guaranteed cleanup. This is a real issue but low severity since temp files are local and not exfiltrated.",
        "meta_exploitability": "Low - requires triggering an exception during processing",
        "meta_impact": "Low - temporary files left on local disk, not data exfiltration"
      }
    }
  ],
  "scan_duration_seconds": 42.01778793334961,
  "duration_ms": 42017,
  "analyzers_used": [
    "static_analyzer",
    "llm_analyzer",
    "meta_analyzer"
  ],
  "timestamp": "2026-02-07T19:26:02.331189"
}