stealthy-auto-browse
5 findings (1 critical, 2 high, 2 medium), mainly data exfiltration, social engineering, resource abuse. Most recent scan 2026-02-07.
CRITICAL SECURITY RISK - This skill presents multiple severe security vulnerabilities. The primary threat is an uncontrolled external network dependency that sends arbitrary browsing commands and potentially sensitive data (including credentials typed via OS-level keyboard input) to a Docker container endpoint. The skill's explicit purpose is to evade bot detection and security controls, which is inherently deceptive and enables malicious use cases. The combination of external network communication, credential exposure via unencrypted keyboard input, lack of resource controls, and missing security metadata creates a high-risk attack surface. The skill should not be used in production environments without significant security hardening including localhost-only enforcement, encryption, authentication, and explicit user consent for sensitive operations.
Scanner's overall assessment (LLM analyzer)
Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector
Independent static run, no language model, over the same files as the Cisco scan above. How the two scanners compare across the whole corpus: Two scanners, one corpus.
What this skill does
Control a stealthy browser that evades bot detection using OS-level input
- Package
- 1 file, 8.1 KB
- SKILL.md
- 994 words, 12+ sections
- Code
- None. Instructions only.
SKILL.md covers: stealthy-auto-browse · Setup Required · Key Concepts · Environment · API Reference · Navigation · Undetectable Input (Use These!) · Playwright Input (Detectable - Use Only When Necessary) · Page Inspection · Screenshots · State & Utility · Resolution Control
Findings
CRITICAL Uncontrolled External Network Dependency with Arbitrary Command Execution Data Exfiltrationllm
The skill requires connection to an external Docker container (stealthy-auto-browse) via STEALTHY_AUTO_BROWSE_URL environment variable. This container provides a headless browser with OS-level input control capabilities. The skill sends arbitrary commands to this external service without validation, creating a critical data exfiltration and command execution vector. An attacker controlling the container endpoint could intercept all browsing activity, credentials entered via system_type, and potentially execute arbitrary commands on the user's system through the browser automation API.
SKILL.md
Environment variable STEALTHY_AUTO_BROWSE_URL points to external service (http://localhost:8080 by default, but configurable to any URL). All API commands are POST requests to this endpoint with JSON payloads containing user data and browsing instructions. The system_type action sends keystrokes (potentially including passwords) to the external service.HIGH Deceptive Purpose: Bot Detection Evasion Tool Social Engineeringllm
The skill's explicit purpose is to evade bot detection systems using OS-level input manipulation and fingerprint spoofing. The description states it is 'completely undetectable by behavioral analysis' and designed to bypass security measures. This capability can be used for malicious purposes including: automated account creation, credential stuffing, scraping protected content, bypassing CAPTCHAs, and other activities that violate terms of service. The skill actively promotes deception and security evasion.
SKILL.md
Key phrases: 'evades bot detection', 'completely undetectable by behavioral analysis', 'Uses Camoufox (custom Firefox) with OS-level mouse/keyboard input', 'Generates consistent fingerprints via browserforge', 'Standard browser automation is detectable... This browser: Uses Firefox (no CDP exposure)'HIGH Credential Exposure via Unencrypted OS-Level Keyboard Input Data Exfiltrationllm
The system_type action sends keyboard input at the OS level to type text, including potentially sensitive data like passwords and credentials. This data is transmitted to the external browser service via HTTP POST requests. There is no indication of encryption, input sanitization, or special handling for sensitive data. Combined with the external network dependency, this creates a high-risk credential exposure vector.
SKILL.md
system_type action: {"action": "system_type", "text": "hello world", "interval": 0.08}. The 'text' parameter can contain any string including passwords. No encryption or sensitive data handling is mentioned. Communication protocol is HTTP POST to STEALTHY_AUTO_BROWSE_URL.MEDIUM Misleading Compatibility and Security Implications Social Engineeringllm
The skill manifest does not specify compatibility, allowed-tools, or license information, while requiring complex external dependencies (Docker container, VNC server, environment configuration). The description 'Control a stealthy browser that evades bot detection' downplays the security implications and potential for misuse. Users may not understand they are installing a tool designed to circumvent security controls.
SKILL.md
YAML manifest shows: license: Not specified, compatibility: Not specified, allowed-tools: Not specified. The setup requires Docker, port forwarding (8080, 5900), environment variable configuration, and external network access - none of which are declared in the manifest.MEDIUM Uncontrolled Resource Consumption via External Browser Resource Abusellm
The skill connects to an external Docker container running a full browser with VNC server. There are no documented limits on: number of browser instances, memory usage, CPU consumption, network bandwidth, or session duration. The 'always: True' flag in metadata suggests persistent execution. An attacker or buggy code could spawn unlimited browser instances or create long-running sessions that exhaust system resources.
SKILL.md
Docker container runs browser + VNC server on ports 8080 and 5900. Metadata shows 'always': True indicating persistent availability. No resource limits, timeouts, or cleanup procedures are documented. The goto action supports 'networkidle' wait condition which could hang indefinitely.What is in the package
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
SKILL.md | doc | 8.1 KB |
External hosts referenced
github.com
Hostnames that appear in the skill's files. Referencing a host is not a finding; compare against the findings above and the skill's stated purpose.
Environment variables referenced
STEALTHY_AUTO_BROWSE_URL
Package contents recorded 2026-10-22. The scan above ran against the version current at scan time; the two can differ if the skill has since been updated.
What we checked
- Static analyzer. Pattern rules over SKILL.md and bundled files: known-bad commands, exfiltration URLs, secrets, obfuscation.
- Llm analyzer. A language model reads the skill and reports intent-level issues the rules cannot express.
- Meta analyzer. A second model pass that validates, deduplicates and re-scores the other analyzers' findings.
What we did not check
- Runtime behaviour. The skill was not executed; findings come from reading its files.
- Anything fetched at install or run time, including remote scripts, package dependencies, and URLs the skill tells the agent to open.
- Content the analyzers cannot read: images, binaries, and some non-English text.
- Known scanner bypass classes. See the methodology and limitations page.
Sources
- Repository: https://clawhub.ai/skills/stealthy-auto-browse
- Raw scan result: stealthy-auto-browse-scan.json
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