clawops
2 findings (2 high), mainly unauthorized tool use, data exfiltration. Most recent scan 2026-02-05.
This skill presents HIGH security risks due to its claimed broad orchestration capabilities without any implementation code to verify safety controls. The skill claims to act as a central orchestration system managing all other skills, including secrets management, automatic restarts, and cross-skill coordination, but provides zero implementation. This creates multiple threat vectors: (1) Tool exploitation through unauthorized skill control, (2) Data exposure through centralized secrets access, (3) Availability risks from autonomous restart capabilities, and (4) Social engineering through unverified capability claims. The complete absence of code makes it impossible to verify any security controls, access restrictions, or safety mechanisms. This appears to be either an incomplete skill package or a deceptive placeholder. The skill should not be trusted or installed until complete, auditable implementation code is provided with proper security controls, access restrictions, and user consent mechanisms for all orchestration operations.
Scanner's overall assessment (LLM analyzer)
Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector
The two scanners disagree: Cisco rates this HIGH and SkillSpector found nothing. Check the false-positive register; signature matches on documentation are the usual cause. How the two scanners compare across the whole corpus: Two scanners, one corpus.
What this skill does
The orchestration tool for OpenClaw, managing and coordinating all your skills seamlessly.
- Package
- 1 file, 783 B
- SKILL.md
- 86 words, 1 sections
- Code
- None. Instructions only.
SKILL.md covers: ClawOps — OpenClaw Skill
Findings
HIGH Unauthorized Skill Orchestration and Control Without Implementation Unauthorized Tool Usellm
The skill claims to act as a 'central brain' that manages, coordinates, discovers, schedules, monitors, restarts, and controls all other installed skills. This represents tool exploitation through skill orchestration capabilities that could enable unauthorized control over other skills' execution, configuration, and behavior. However, no implementation code is provided, making it impossible to verify safety controls or validate the claimed functionality.
SKILL.md
Description claims: 'acts as the central brain for OpenClaw, intelligently managing all installed skills', 'discovers available skills, resolves dependencies, and schedules actions', 'detect failures, restart stuck skills', 'unifying configuration, secrets management, and event handling'. No Python or Bash scripts provided to implement these capabilities.HIGH Centralized Secrets Management Without Security Controls Data Exfiltrationllm
The skill claims to provide 'centralized secrets management' across all skills, which would require access to sensitive credentials, API keys, and authentication tokens. Without implementation code or security controls visible, this represents a significant data exposure risk. A compromised or malicious orchestration skill with access to all secrets could exfiltrate credentials for all installed skills.
SKILL.md
Claims 'unifying configuration, secrets management' across all skills. No code provided showing how secrets are stored, encrypted, accessed, or protected. No evidence of encryption, access controls, or secure storage mechanisms.What is in the package
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
SKILL.md | doc | 783 B |
Package contents recorded 2026-10-22. The scan above ran against the version current at scan time; the two can differ if the skill has since been updated.
What we checked
- Static analyzer. Pattern rules over SKILL.md and bundled files: known-bad commands, exfiltration URLs, secrets, obfuscation.
- Behavioral analyzer. Checks what the skill asks the agent to do against what its description claims it does.
- Llm analyzer. A language model reads the skill and reports intent-level issues the rules cannot express.
- Trigger analyzer. Looks for instructions that fire on conditions the user did not ask for.
- Meta analyzer. A second model pass that validates, deduplicates and re-scores the other analyzers' findings.
What we did not check
- Runtime behaviour. The skill was not executed; findings come from reading its files.
- Anything fetched at install or run time, including remote scripts, package dependencies, and URLs the skill tells the agent to open.
- Content the analyzers cannot read: images, binaries, and some non-English text.
- Known scanner bypass classes. See the methodology and limitations page.
Sources
- Repository: https://clawhub.ai/skills/clawops
- Raw scan result: clawops-scan.json
- Badge for your README:
 - Request a re-scan