agent-browser
10 findings (1 high, 7 medium, 1 low, 1 info), mainly data exfiltration, unauthorized tool use, policy violation. Most recent scan 2026-10-22.
This is a byte-identical copy of agent-browser from 101-skills, which is the primary page for this skill. Same SKILL.md, same files; each copy is scanned separately so divergence shows up here.
Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector
Independent static run, no language model, over the same files as the Cisco scan above. How the two scanners compare across the whole corpus: Two scanners, one corpus.
What this skill does
Browser automation for AI agents via inference.sh. Navigate web pages, interact with elements using @e refs, take screenshots, record video. Capabilities: web scraping, form filling, clicking, typing, drag-drop, file upload, JavaScript execution. Use for: web automation, data extraction, testing, agent browsing, research. Triggers: browser, web automation, scrape, navigate, click, fill form, screenshot, browse web, playwright, headless browser, web agent, surf internet, record video
- Package
- 10 files, 62 KB
- SKILL.md
- 1179 words, 12+ sections
- Code
- Shell (3)
- Allowed tools
Bash(belt*)
SKILL.md covers: Agentic Browser · Quick Start · Open a page and get interactive elements · Core Workflow · 1. Start session · Elements: @e1 [input] "Email", @e2 [input] "Password", @e3 [button] "Sign In" · 2. Fill and submit · 3. Re-snapshot after navigation · 4. Close when done · Functions · Interact Actions · Element Refs
Findings
HIGH Code executes bash but Bash tool not in allowed-tools Unauthorized Tool Usestatic
Skill restricts tools to ['Bash(belt', '*)'] but code executes bash commands
SKILL.md
MEDIUM Bash: tainted data flows to dangerous sink Data Exfiltrationbehavioral
Variable $SESSION_ID (line 60) flows to `sh` at line 76.
templates/capture-workflow.sh:76
infsh app run agent-browser --function interact --session $SESSION_ID --input '{MEDIUM Bash: tainted data flows to dangerous sink Data Exfiltrationbehavioral
Variable $SESSION_ID (line 60) flows to `sh` at line 79.
templates/capture-workflow.sh:79
infsh app run agent-browser --function interact --session $SESSION_ID --input '{MEDIUM Bash: tainted data flows to dangerous sink Data Exfiltrationbehavioral
Variable $SESSION_ID (line 60) flows to `sh` at line 86.
templates/capture-workflow.sh:86
RESULT=$(infsh app run agent-browser --function snapshot --session $SESSION_ID --input '{}')MEDIUM Bash: tainted data flows to dangerous sink Data Exfiltrationbehavioral
Variable $SESSION_ID (line 60) flows to `sh` at line 91.
templates/capture-workflow.sh:91
infsh app run agent-browser --function screenshot --session $SESSION_ID --input '{}' > "$OUTPUT_DIR/page-screenshot.json"MEDIUM Bash: tainted data flows to dangerous sink Data Exfiltrationbehavioral
Variable $SESSION_ID (line 60) flows to `sh` at line 97.
templates/capture-workflow.sh:97
infsh app run agent-browser --function screenshot --session $SESSION_ID --input '{MEDIUM Bash: tainted data flows to dangerous sink Data Exfiltrationbehavioral
Variable $SESSION_ID (line 60) flows to `sh` at line 105.
templates/capture-workflow.sh:105
RESULT=$(infsh app run agent-browser --function execute --session $SESSION_ID --input '{MEDIUM Bash: tainted data flows to dangerous sink Data Exfiltrationbehavioral
Variable $SESSION_ID (line 60) flows to `sh` at line 114.
templates/capture-workflow.sh:114
RESULT=$(infsh app run agent-browser --function execute --session $SESSION_ID --input '{LOW Code uses search/grep patterns but Grep tool not in allowed-tools Unauthorized Tool Usestatic
Skill restricts tools to ['Bash(belt', '*)'] but code uses regex search patterns
SKILL.md
INFO Skill does not specify a license Policy Violationstatic
Skill manifest does not include a 'license' field. Specifying a license helps users understand usage terms.
SKILL.md
What is in the package
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
SKILL.md | doc | 9.5 KB |
references/authentication.md | doc | 7.4 KB |
references/commands.md | doc | 6.4 KB |
references/proxy-support.md | doc | 6.7 KB |
references/session-management.md | doc | 4.9 KB |
references/snapshot-refs.md | doc | 6.3 KB |
references/video-recording.md | doc | 7.2 KB |
templates/authenticated-session.sh | script | 4.5 KB |
templates/capture-workflow.sh | script | 5.6 KB |
templates/form-automation.sh | script | 3.9 KB |
External hosts referenced
inference.sh site.com httpbin.org cloud.inference.sh corpproxy.company.com external-vendor.com google.com mysite.com raw.githubusercontent.com site1.com site2.com whatismyip.com
Hostnames that appear in the skill's files. Referencing a host is not a finding; compare against the findings above and the skill's stated purpose.
Environment variables referenced
SESSION_ID OUTPUT_DIR LOGIN_URL PASSWORD REGION APP_PASSWORD APP_USERNAME CI_ARTIFACTS_DIR FORM_URL PROXY_URL TARGET_URL TASK_ID CORP_PASS FORM_EMAIL GOOGLE_PASSWORD TEST_URL TOTP_SECRET URLS USERNAME
Package contents recorded 2026-10-22 at commit becc25649700. The scan above ran against the version current at scan time; the two can differ if the skill has since been updated.
What we checked
- Static analyzer. Pattern rules over SKILL.md and bundled files: known-bad commands, exfiltration URLs, secrets, obfuscation.
- Bytecode analyzer.
- Pipeline analyzer.
- Correlation analyzer.
- Behavioral analyzer. Checks what the skill asks the agent to do against what its description claims it does.
- Trigger analyzer. Looks for instructions that fire on conditions the user did not ask for.
What we did not check
- Runtime behaviour. The skill was not executed; findings come from reading its files.
- Anything fetched at install or run time, including remote scripts, package dependencies, and URLs the skill tells the agent to open.
- Content the analyzers cannot read: images, binaries, and some non-English text.
- Known scanner bypass classes. See the methodology and limitations page.
Sources
- Repository: https://github.com/magentosh/superpowers
- Raw scan result: magentosh-superpowers-tools-utilities-agent-browser-scan.json
- Badge for your README:
 - Request a re-scan