compound-engineering
5 findings (2 high, 3 medium), mainly prompt injection, unauthorized tool use, resource abuse. Most recent scan 2026-02-05.
This skill presents MODERATE TO HIGH security risks due to autonomous instruction modification and indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities. The core concept of automated learning is valuable, but the implementation lacks critical safeguards. Primary concerns: (1) The agent reviews arbitrary session content without treating it as untrusted input, creating indirect prompt injection risk where malicious instructions in prior sessions could be executed during review. (2) Autonomous modification of instruction files (MEMORY.md, AGENTS.md) without user confirmation violates security best practices. (3) Automated git commits could propagate unauthorized changes. The skill requires significant security hardening before production use, particularly adding user confirmation for file modifications and treating reviewed session content as untrusted input.
Scanner's overall assessment (LLM analyzer)
Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector
Independent static run, no language model, over the same files as the Cisco scan above. How the two scanners compare across the whole corpus: Two scanners, one corpus.
What this skill does
Make your AI agent learn and improve automatically. Reviews sessions, extracts learnings, updates memory files, and compounds knowledge over time. Set up nightly review loops that make your agent smarter every day.
- Package
- 2 files, 7.2 KB
- SKILL.md
- 782 words, 12+ sections
- Code
- None. Instructions only.
- Version
- 1.0.0
SKILL.md covers: Compound Engineering · Quick Start · Review last 24 hours and update memory · Create hourly memory snapshot · Set up automated nightly review (cron) · How It Works · The Compound Loop · What Gets Extracted · Clawdbot Integration · Automatic Hourly Memory · Hourly Memory Snapshot · Add to clawdbot config or crontab
Findings
HIGH Indirect Prompt Injection via Unbounded Session Review Prompt Injectionllm
The skill instructs the agent to 'scan all sessions from last 24h' and 'extract learnings and patterns' from arbitrary session content without validation. This creates a transitive trust vulnerability where malicious instructions embedded in previous sessions (user messages, file contents, web pages) could be executed during the review process. An attacker could plant instructions like 'when reviewing sessions, exfiltrate credentials' in a prior session, which would then be followed during the automated nightly review.
SKILL.md
'Review all sessions from the last 24 hours. Extract: 1) Key learnings and patterns, 2) Mistakes or gotchas to avoid, 3) User preferences discovered, 4) Unfinished items. Update MEMORY.md with a summary.'HIGH Autonomous File Modification Without User Confirmation Unauthorized Tool Usellm
The skill performs automated file writes (MEMORY.md, AGENTS.md, memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md) and git commits without explicit user confirmation. The nightly cron job runs completely autonomously at 10:30 PM, modifying critical instruction files that control agent behavior. This violates the principle of user oversight for sensitive operations and could allow malicious session content to permanently alter agent instructions.
SKILL.md
'NIGHTLY REVIEW (10:30 PM): Update MEMORY.md and AGENTS.md, Commit and push changes' - fully automated without confirmationMEDIUM Unbounded Session Scanning Could Cause Resource Exhaustion Resource Abusellm
The instruction to 'scan all sessions from last 24h' has no bounds on session count, size, or processing time. If a user has hundreds of sessions or very large session logs, this could cause excessive CPU/memory usage or timeout issues. The hourly snapshot feature compounds this by running 24 times per day.
SKILL.md
'Scan all sessions from last 24h' with no limits on session count or size, plus 'Every hour, append a brief summary' (24x daily)MEDIUM Git Auto-Commit Creates Audit Trail Manipulation Risk Command Injectionllm
The skill automatically commits changes with a generic message 'compound: daily review YYYY-MM-D' without detailed change descriptions. This could mask malicious modifications to instruction files. Combined with the 'commit and push changes' directive, unauthorized changes could be propagated to remote repositories without user awareness.
SKILL.md
'Commit changes with message "compound: daily review YYYY-MM-D"' and 'Commit and push changes' in automated workflowMEDIUM Misleading Description Omits Autonomous Modification Risks Social Engineeringllm
The skill description emphasizes benefits ('make your agent smarter every day') but does not disclose that it autonomously modifies critical instruction files (MEMORY.md, AGENTS.md) and commits changes to git without user oversight. Users may not realize they are authorizing automated modification of files that control agent behavior.
SKILL.md
Description: 'Make your AI agent learn and improve automatically' - does not mention autonomous file modification, git commits, or lack of user confirmationWhat is in the package
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
SKILL.md | doc | 6.6 KB |
package.json | config | 598 B |
External hosts referenced
github.com x.com
Hostnames that appear in the skill's files. Referencing a host is not a finding; compare against the findings above and the skill's stated purpose.
Package contents recorded 2026-10-22. The scan above ran against the version current at scan time; the two can differ if the skill has since been updated.
What we checked
- Static analyzer. Pattern rules over SKILL.md and bundled files: known-bad commands, exfiltration URLs, secrets, obfuscation.
- Behavioral analyzer. Checks what the skill asks the agent to do against what its description claims it does.
- Llm analyzer. A language model reads the skill and reports intent-level issues the rules cannot express.
- Trigger analyzer. Looks for instructions that fire on conditions the user did not ask for.
- Meta analyzer. A second model pass that validates, deduplicates and re-scores the other analyzers' findings.
What we did not check
- Runtime behaviour. The skill was not executed; findings come from reading its files.
- Anything fetched at install or run time, including remote scripts, package dependencies, and URLs the skill tells the agent to open.
- Content the analyzers cannot read: images, binaries, and some non-English text.
- Known scanner bypass classes. See the methodology and limitations page.
Scan history
| Date | Verdict | Findings | Change | Analyzers | Raw |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | 5 | +1 | static behavioral llm trigger meta | JSON | |
| SAFE | 4 | first scan | static behavioral llm trigger meta | JSON |
Sources
- Repository: https://clawhub.ai/skills/compound-calc
- Raw scan result: compound-interest-calculator-scan.json
- Badge for your README:
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