redis
Verdict safe, but 4 findings (4 medium), mainly resource abuse, data exfiltration, command injection. Most recent scan 2026-02-07.
The Redis skill presents MEDIUM security risks primarily related to command injection vulnerabilities, lack of authentication mechanisms, and dangerous Redis operations without safeguards. The skill demonstrates direct shell execution of redis-cli commands with user-provided input, which creates command injection opportunities. The use of blocking KEYS commands and destructive FLUSHDB operations without confirmation mechanisms poses availability and data integrity risks. The hardcoded connection string lacks authentication, exposing Redis instances to unauthorized access. While the skill provides useful Redis management functionality, it requires significant security hardening including input validation, authentication enforcement, command safeguards, and comprehensive security documentation before production use.
Scanner's overall assessment (LLM analyzer)
Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector
Independent static run, no language model, over the same files as the Cisco scan above. How the two scanners compare across the whole corpus: Two scanners, one corpus.
What this skill does
Redis database management. Key-value operations, caching, pub/sub, and data structure commands.
- Package
- 1 file, 685 B
- SKILL.md
- 69 words, 5 sections
- Code
- None. Instructions only.
- Requires
- bins:
curljq
SKILL.md covers: Redis 🔴 · Setup · Features · Usage Examples · Commands
Findings
MEDIUM Hardcoded Redis Connection Without Authentication Data Exfiltrationllm
The skill uses a hardcoded REDIS_URL environment variable (redis://localhost:6379) without any authentication mechanism. This exposes the Redis instance to unauthorized access if the environment variable is set. Redis databases often contain sensitive cached data, session information, or application state that could be accessed or manipulated by malicious actors.
SKILL.md:9
export REDIS_URL="redis://localhost:6379"MEDIUM Command Injection Risk via Unvalidated redis-cli Commands Command Injectionllm
The skill documentation shows direct redis-cli command execution with user-provided patterns and values without any input validation or sanitization. The examples show KEYS pattern matching and SET operations that could be exploited for command injection if user input is passed directly to redis-cli without proper escaping. An attacker could inject additional Redis commands or shell metacharacters.
SKILL.md
redis-cli GET key
redis-cli SET key value EX 3600
redis-cli KEYS "pattern*"MEDIUM Dangerous KEYS Command Can Cause Performance Degradation Resource Abusellm
The skill demonstrates use of the KEYS command (redis-cli KEYS "pattern*") which is known to block Redis and cause severe performance issues on production databases with large keyspaces. The KEYS command is O(N) and blocks the server while iterating through all keys, potentially causing denial of service in production environments.
SKILL.md:32
redis-cli KEYS "pattern*"MEDIUM FLUSHDB/FLUSHALL Risk Without Confirmation Resource Abusellm
The skill mentions 'Flush cache' functionality which typically involves FLUSHDB or FLUSHALL commands that delete all data in the Redis database. These are destructive operations that could cause data loss and service disruption if executed accidentally or maliciously. No confirmation mechanism or safeguards are documented.
SKILL.md:25
"Flush cache"What is in the package
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
SKILL.md | doc | 685 B |
Package contents recorded 2026-10-22. The scan above ran against the version current at scan time; the two can differ if the skill has since been updated.
What we checked
- Static analyzer. Pattern rules over SKILL.md and bundled files: known-bad commands, exfiltration URLs, secrets, obfuscation.
- Llm analyzer. A language model reads the skill and reports intent-level issues the rules cannot express.
- Meta analyzer. A second model pass that validates, deduplicates and re-scores the other analyzers' findings.
What we did not check
- Runtime behaviour. The skill was not executed; findings come from reading its files.
- Anything fetched at install or run time, including remote scripts, package dependencies, and URLs the skill tells the agent to open.
- Content the analyzers cannot read: images, binaries, and some non-English text.
- Known scanner bypass classes. See the methodology and limitations page.
Sources
- Repository: https://clawhub.ai/skills/redis
- Raw scan result: redis-scan.json
- Badge for your README:
 - Request a re-scan