design-taste-frontend

ISSUES FOUND max severity CRITICALSkillSpector Do not install 100 registry leonxlnx last scanned 2026-10-22 1 scan

39 findings (30 critical, 5 medium, 3 low, 1 info), mainly command injection, data exfiltration, unauthorized tool use. Most recent scan 2026-10-22.

Findings39

Critical30

High0

Medium5

Low3

Analyzersstatic bytecode pipeline correlation behavioral trigger

Scanner version2.3.1

Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector

VerdictDo not install 100

Score100 / 100

Issues84

CategoriesData Exfiltration analysis-evasion Privilege Escalation

Version2.12.0 (static)

Independent static run, no language model, over the same files as the Cisco scan above. How the two scanners compare across the whole corpus: Two scanners, one corpus.

What this skill does

tasteskill v2, the anti-slop frontend skill. Art direction for websites, distilled from a study of 247 curated gallery sites (One Page Love, Awwwards Sites of the Day). Deals researched directions (idea, composition, type, palette, photographs, section blueprints) from a library, enforces a strict no-slop house style with a real-browser inspector, and runs a look-and-fix loop on screenshots. Use this whenever you build, design, redesign, restyle, polish or review a landing page, marketing site, portfolio, product page, one-pager, hero or any public-facing web page, in any stack (HTML/CSS,…

Package: 38 files, 2.3 MB
SKILL.md: 6331 words, 12+ sections
Code: JavaScript (12)

SKILL.md covers: tasteskill v2 · Page or app screen · The run · 1. Read the brief and the project · 2. Write the argument · 3. Draw the direction · 4. Find the idea · 5. Write the words · 6. Build it, still · 7. Gate · 8. Look · 9. Move

Findings

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:108

await helper.eval((a) => {

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:124

const early = await page.eval(TITLE_SEEN).catch(() => null);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:125

await page.eval('document.fonts.ready.then(() => true)').catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:129

const metrics = await page.eval(probe);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:133

const frameChecks = [await page.eval(frame).catch(() => null)];

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:136

await page.eval(`window.scrollTo({ top: ${i * h}, behavior: 'instant' })`).catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:140

frameChecks.push(await page.eval(frame).catch(() => null));

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:141

await page.eval('window.__motionSample && window.__motionSample()').catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:143

const motion = await page.eval('window.__motion ? window.__motion() : null').catch(() => null);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:145

await page.eval(`window.scrollTo({ top: 0, behavior: 'instant' })`).catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:147

const after = await page.eval(probe).catch(() => metrics);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:149

const lay = await page.eval(layout).catch(() => null);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:150

const appM = appMode ? await page.eval(app).catch(() => null) : null;

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:151

if (appM) appM.colourShare = await helper.eval(colourShare, 'data:image/jpeg;base64,' + frames[0]).catch(() => null);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:154

const sceneState = w >= 1100 && !appMode ? await page.eval(`[...document.querySelectorAll('section.scene, .scene[data-scene]')].map((s) => ({ id: s.dataset.scene || s.id || 'scene', live: s.classList.contains('is-live'), rest: s.classList.contains('is-rest'), h: Math.round(s.getBoundingClientRect().height) }))`).catch(() => []) : [];

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:170

await page.eval(`window.scrollTo({ top: 0, behavior: 'instant' })`).catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:177

const y = await page.eval('Math.round(scrollY || document.scrollingElement.scrollTop || 0)').catch(() => -1);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/inspect.mjs:243

const hidden = await rp.eval(`(() => {

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Node.js child_process module usage for shell command execution Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: from 'node:child_process'

scripts/lib/cdp.mjs:4

import { spawn, spawnSync } from 'node:child_process';

Remediation: Avoid child_process. If required, use execFile with explicit arguments instead of exec with shell strings

CRITICAL Node.js child_process module usage for shell command execution Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: spawnSync(

scripts/lib/cdp.mjs:85

try { if (pid) { if (process.platform === 'win32') spawnSync('taskkill', ['/pid', String(pid), '/T', '/F'], { stdio: 'ignore' }); else process.kill(pid, 'SIGKILL'); } } catch {}

Remediation: Avoid child_process. If required, use execFile with explicit arguments instead of exec with shell strings

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/lib/cdp.mjs:204

async eval(fnOrExpr, arg) {

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:55

await helper.eval((a) => {

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:70

await page.eval('document.fonts.ready.then(() => true)').catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:72

const scenes = await page.eval(SCENES);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:82

await page.eval(go(Math.round(p.y))).catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:94

await page.eval(go(Math.max(0, scenes[0].top - H))).catch(() => {});

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:96

await page.eval(`(() => { window.__f = []; let last = performance.now(); const tick = (t) => { window.__f.push(t - last); last = t; if (window.__f.length < 600) requestAnimationFrame(tick); }; requestAnimationFrame(tick); })()`);

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:99

const f = await page.eval('window.__f.slice(2)');

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:112

const h = await rp.eval('document.documentElement.scrollHeight');

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

CRITICAL Dangerous code execution functions that can execute arbitrary code Command Injectionstatic

Pattern detected: eval(

scripts/scenes.mjs:114

for (let y = 0, k = 0; y < h && k < 16; y += 900, k++) { await rp.eval(`window.scrollTo(0, ${y})`); await sleep(350); frames.push(await rp.screenshot({ quality: 70 })); labels.push(`reduced motion, screen ${k + 1}`); }

Remediation: Avoid eval(), exec(), and compile(). Use safer alternatives like ast.literal_eval() or operator module

MEDIUM Outbound network request primitives in JavaScript/TypeScript Data Exfiltrationstatic

Pattern detected: fetch(

scripts/assets.mjs:187

try { r = await fetch(url, { headers: { 'User-Agent': UA, Accept: 'application/json', ...headers }, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(ms) }); }

Remediation: Ensure network operations are necessary and document allowed destinations

MEDIUM Outbound network request primitives in JavaScript/TypeScript Data Exfiltrationstatic

Pattern detected: fetch(

scripts/assets.mjs:248

const r = await fetch(url, { headers: { ...headers, Range: `bytes=0-${want - 1}` }, signal: ac.signal, redirect: 'follow' });

Remediation: Ensure network operations are necessary and document allowed destinations

MEDIUM Outbound network request primitives in JavaScript/TypeScript Data Exfiltrationstatic

Pattern detected: fetch(

scripts/assets.mjs:742

try { r = await fetch(it.image, { headers: imageHeaders(it.image), signal: AbortSignal.timeout(90000) }); }

Remediation: Ensure network operations are necessary and document allowed destinations

MEDIUM Outbound network request primitives in JavaScript/TypeScript Data Exfiltrationstatic

Pattern detected: fetch(

scripts/assets.mjs:784

try { r = await fetch(it.image, { headers: { 'User-Agent': UA, Accept: 'video/*' }, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(600000) }); }

Remediation: Ensure network operations are necessary and document allowed destinations

MEDIUM Outbound network request primitives in JavaScript/TypeScript Data Exfiltrationstatic

Pattern detected: fetch(

scripts/assets.mjs:805

const pr = await fetch(it.poster, { headers: imageHeaders(it.poster), signal: AbortSignal.timeout(60000) });

Remediation: Ensure network operations are necessary and document allowed destinations

LOW Script contacts a destination the documentation never mentions Unauthorized Tool Usestatic

Script contacts or configures 'www.artic.edu' but the skill documentation never visibly mentions it. Undocumented network destinations can indicate behaviour the manifest and description do not disclose.

scripts/assets.mjs:433

Remediation: Document the destination in SKILL.md (or the manifest description) if it is intended, or remove the undisclosed network access. Organizations can list internal hosts in llm_analysis.trusted_reference_domains.

LOW Script contacts a destination the documentation never mentions Unauthorized Tool Usestatic

Script contacts or configures 'www.nasa.gov' but the skill documentation never visibly mentions it. Undocumented network destinations can indicate behaviour the manifest and description do not disclose.

scripts/assets.mjs:570

LOW Script contacts a destination the documentation never mentions Unauthorized Tool Usestatic

Script contacts or configures 'x' but the skill documentation never visibly mentions it. Undocumented network destinations can indicate behaviour the manifest and description do not disclose.

scripts/inspect.mjs:53

INFO Skill does not specify a license Policy Violationstatic

Skill manifest does not include a 'license' field. Specifying a license helps users understand usage terms.

SKILL.md

Remediation: Add 'license' field to SKILL.md frontmatter (e.g., MIT, Apache-2.0)

What is in the package

38 files, 2.3 MB. Show the list.

File	Kind	Size
`README.md`	doc	5.2 KB
`SKILL.md`	doc	38 KB
`assets/app.css`	data	16 KB
`assets/base.css`	data	6.4 KB
`assets/base.js`	script	2.1 KB
`assets/charts.js`	script	57 KB
`evals/evals.json`	config	8.0 KB
`library/app.json`	config	72 KB
`library/directions.json`	config	60 KB
`library/heroes.json`	config	106 KB
`library/motions.json`	config	8.8 KB
`library/palettes.json`	config	34 KB
`library/photos.json`	config	157 KB
`library/sections.json`	config	270 KB
`library/sites.json`	config	849 KB
`library/type.json`	config	80 KB
`references/app-screens.md`	doc	83 KB
`references/colour.md`	doc	6.7 KB
`references/copy.md`	doc	9.2 KB
`references/critique.md`	doc	11 KB
`references/imagery.md`	doc	50 KB
`references/layout.md`	doc	18 KB
`references/motion.md`	doc	54 KB
`references/research.md`	doc	24 KB
`references/scenes.md`	doc	9.6 KB
`references/tells.md`	doc	7.2 KB
`references/type.md`	doc	8.3 KB
`scripts/assets.mjs`	script	63 KB
`scripts/draw.mjs`	script	53 KB
`scripts/inspect.mjs`	script	27 KB
`scripts/lint.mjs`	script	11 KB
`scripts/scenes.mjs`	script	8.8 KB
`assets/scenes/stage.css`	data	1.1 KB
`assets/scenes/stage.js`	script	7.3 KB
`scripts/lib/app-draw.mjs`	script	14 KB
`scripts/lib/cdp.mjs`	script	12 KB
`scripts/lib/probe.mjs`	script	79 KB
`scripts/lib/rules.mjs`	script	36 KB

External hosts referenced

unsplash.com fonts.googleapis.com api.fontshare.com cdn.jsdelivr.net picsum.photos archive.org collectionapi.metmuseum.org www.artic.edu api.artic.edu api.openverse.org commons.wikimedia.org fonts.gstatic.com images-api.nasa.gov members-play.lacoste.com 2xa.studio aardvarkbookclub.com altergresources.com anidachi.com applied-imagination.gpc.consulting aprilleihuanani.com artemartemartem.com beigeforce.com belgrade.klmln.com belgradearbor.rs berd.xyz bleibtgleich.dev blode.co boc.studio brand.squarespace.com builderstable.net

Hostnames that appear in the skill's files. Referencing a host is not a finding; compare against the findings above and the skill's stated purpose.

Environment variables referenced

CHROME_PATH ASSETS_PATH PUPPETEER_EXECUTABLE_PATH USERPROFILE

Package contents recorded 2026-10-22 at commit 6010f91a9935. The scan above ran against the version current at scan time; the two can differ if the skill has since been updated.

What we checked

Static analyzer. Pattern rules over SKILL.md and bundled files: known-bad commands, exfiltration URLs, secrets, obfuscation.
Bytecode analyzer.
Pipeline analyzer.
Correlation analyzer.
Behavioral analyzer. Checks what the skill asks the agent to do against what its description claims it does.
Trigger analyzer. Looks for instructions that fire on conditions the user did not ask for.

What we did not check

Runtime behaviour. The skill was not executed; findings come from reading its files.
Anything fetched at install or run time, including remote scripts, package dependencies, and URLs the skill tells the agent to open.
Content the analyzers cannot read: images, binaries, and some non-English text.
Known scanner bypass classes. See the methodology and limitations page.

Sources

Repository: https://github.com/leonxlnx/taste-skill
Raw scan result: leonxlnx-taste-skill-skills-taste-skill-scan.json
Badge for your README: ![skillscan.io](https://skillscan.io/badge/leonxlnx-design-taste-frontend.svg)
Request a re-scan

Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector

What this skill does

Findings

What is in the package

External hosts referenced

Environment variables referenced

What we checked

What we did not check

Sources

Related skills