gitclaw
5 findings (2 high, 3 medium), mainly command injection, resource abuse, data exfiltration. Most recent scan 2026-02-06.
This skill presents HIGH security risks due to unrestricted sudo command execution, automated system modifications, and silent background operations. While the functionality (GitHub backup) is legitimate, the implementation bypasses user oversight for privileged operations by design ('do everything automatically and quietly'). The skill installs packages, modifies system services, creates cron jobs, and pushes data to GitHub with minimal user interaction after initial setup. The missing allowed-tools declaration and incomplete description further obscure the skill's true system impact. Recommended actions: Require explicit confirmation for all sudo operations, add allowed-tools restrictions, improve transparency about system modifications, and implement safeguards against sensitive data exposure.
Scanner's overall assessment (LLM analyzer)
Second scanner: NVIDIA SkillSpector
Independent static run, no language model, over the same files as the Cisco scan above. How the two scanners compare across the whole corpus: Two scanners, one corpus.
What this skill does
Back up the OpenClaw agent workspace to a GitHub repo and keep it synced via a cron-driven commit/push script.
- Package
- 1 file, 10 KB
- SKILL.md
- 1425 words, 12+ sections
- Code
- None. Instructions only.
- Homepage
- https://gitclaw.ai
SKILL.md covers: GitClaw: Agent self-backup to GitHub · When to use · Behavioral rule (important) · Inputs to ask the user for · Step 1: Ensure prerequisites (auto-install) · 1A) Ensure git is installed (auto-install; do not stop) · 1B) Ensure cron/crontab is available (best-effort auto-install) · Step 2: Ensure GitHub CLI (`gh`) is installed (auto-install) · Step 3: Ensure the user is authenticated in `gh` (agent runs the flow) · Step 4: Initialize git in the OpenClaw workspace and connect/create the repo · Step 5: Install deterministic backup script (NO AI / NO heartbeat) · GitClaw deterministic backup (no AI)
Findings
HIGH Unrestricted Command Execution with sudo Privileges Command Injectionllm
The skill executes numerous system commands with sudo privileges (apt-get, dnf, yum, pacman, zypper, apk, systemctl, service) without user confirmation or validation. This allows arbitrary package installation and system service manipulation. The instructions explicitly state 'Do everything automatically and quietly' which bypasses user oversight for privileged operations.
SKILL.md
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y git, sudo systemctl enable --now cron, sudo dnf install -y cronie, sudo yum install -y cronie, sudo pacman -S --noconfirm cronie, sudo apk add dcron, sudo rc-update add dcron defaultHIGH Automated Cron Job Installation Without User Control Resource Abusellm
The skill automatically installs and configures cron jobs that will execute git operations periodically (default every 60 minutes) without clear user visibility or easy removal mechanism. The 'do everything automatically and quietly' directive means users may not be aware of background processes consuming resources and making network calls.
SKILL.md
Backup frequency in minutes (default: 60), Do everything automatically and quietly, Only message the user when you need inputs or operations failMEDIUM Automated GitHub Repository Creation and Data Upload Data Exfiltrationllm
The skill automatically creates GitHub repositories (public or private) and pushes workspace data without explicit per-operation user confirmation. While it asks for initial repository settings, subsequent automated commits and pushes happen silently. This could lead to unintended data exposure, especially if sensitive files are in the workspace.
SKILL.md
back up / sync / mirror the OpenClaw workspace, set up periodic commits and pushes, Do everything automatically and quietlyMEDIUM Missing allowed-tools Declaration with Extensive System Modifications Unauthorized Tool Usellm
The skill performs extensive system operations (package installation, service management, cron configuration, git operations, GitHub API calls) but does not declare any allowed-tools restrictions in the manifest. This makes it impossible for users or the agent to validate that the skill's operations are within expected boundaries.
SKILL.md
allowed-tools: Not specified, but skill executes: sudo commands, package managers (apt-get, dnf, yum, pacman, zypper, apk, brew), systemctl/service commands, crontab modifications, git operations, gh CLI operationsMEDIUM Incomplete Description Masks Privileged System Operations Social Engineeringllm
The skill description states it will 'back up the OpenClaw agent workspace to a GitHub repo' but does not disclose that it will automatically install system packages with sudo, modify system services (cron), or execute privileged commands. This is misleading about the skill's actual scope and system impact.
SKILL.md
description: Back up the OpenClaw agent workspace to a GitHub repo and keep it synced via a cron-driven commit/push script. (Does not mention: sudo operations, package installation, system service modification, automated background processes)What is in the package
| File | Kind | Size |
|---|---|---|
SKILL.md | doc | 10 KB |
External hosts referenced
cli.github.com github.com gitclaw.ai
Hostnames that appear in the skill's files. Referencing a host is not a finding; compare against the findings above and the skill's stated purpose.
Environment variables referenced
WORKSPACE_DIR REMOTE_URL STATE_DIR LOCK_DIR
Package contents recorded 2026-10-22. The scan above ran against the version current at scan time; the two can differ if the skill has since been updated.
What we checked
- Static analyzer. Pattern rules over SKILL.md and bundled files: known-bad commands, exfiltration URLs, secrets, obfuscation.
- Behavioral analyzer. Checks what the skill asks the agent to do against what its description claims it does.
- Llm analyzer. A language model reads the skill and reports intent-level issues the rules cannot express.
- Trigger analyzer. Looks for instructions that fire on conditions the user did not ask for.
- Meta analyzer. A second model pass that validates, deduplicates and re-scores the other analyzers' findings.
What we did not check
- Runtime behaviour. The skill was not executed; findings come from reading its files.
- Anything fetched at install or run time, including remote scripts, package dependencies, and URLs the skill tells the agent to open.
- Content the analyzers cannot read: images, binaries, and some non-English text.
- Known scanner bypass classes. See the methodology and limitations page.
Sources
- Repository: https://clawhub.ai/skills/gitclaw
- Raw scan result: gitclaw-scan.json
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